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This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism hazard on the performance of private participation infrastructure
projects. Applying transaction cost theory, we hypothesize that terrorism hazard has a negative relationship with
infrastructure project completion, and that host government accountability and investor experience with
terrorism hazard have opposing impacts on this relationship. Host government accountability, we argue, pro
duces higher indirect costs of managing terrorism hazard, which reduces investor confidence, and reinforces the
negative relationship between terrorism hazard and the probability of satisfactory project completion.
Conversely, investor’s experience with terrorism hazard increases investor confidence and hence partially mit
igates the negative consequences of terrorism hazard which hamper project completion. Hence, the impact of
terrorism is weakened for projects led by firms from higher terrorism hazard countries. We find support for our
hypotheses using a sample of 5,083 projects in 135 countries from 2002 to 2017.

1. Introduction
Acts of terrorism pose significant threats to people and their property
all over the world (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2010). These acts
of violence and destruction, while rare, are highly unpredictable, everpresent threats in developing and developed countries alike (Dau,
Moore, & Abrahms, 2018; Henisz, Mansfield, & Glinow, 2010). Gov
ernment responses to terrorism, in the form of deterrence and enhanced
security measures, create additional burdens on the citizens, interna
tional travelers, distribution channels, and institutions of countries that
have experienced terrorist activities (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008; Chasdi,
2017a). Terrorism has substantially impacted both business interests
and decisions in Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa, especially since the 1970s (Newcomer & Adkins, 1980).
Following high-profile events, like the attacks on the World Trade
Center in New York, the impacts of terrorism have become an apparent
fact of life in North America as well. Attacks on infrastructure, in
particular, are a major concern of the state, necessitating both private
and government intervention (Lian & Haimes, 2006; Stewart, 2010).
International business scholars have taken an increasing interest in
the impact of violent conflict on the level of investment and performance
of multinational firms (Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013; Li & Vashchilko,

2010; Oetzel & Getz, 2012; Oh & Oetzel, 2011, 2017). Terrorism hazard,
in particular, increases business insolvency in both developing and
fragile states, alike (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2017; Tingbani, Okafor,
Tauringana, & Zalata, 2019). Terrorism also produces non-intuitive
business behaviors, such as increasing acts of corporate social re
sponsibility (Abrahms, Dau, & Moore, 2019) and shunning investment
in urban centers, even in cities that have not experienced a major
terrorist attack (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008). Researchers of public policy
and the built environment have long sought to identify successful stra
tegies for assessing risk and mitigating the occurrence and destructive
outcomes of terrorist attacks (Greenbaum, Dugan, & Lafree, 2007;
Matsika, O’Neill, Battista, Khosravi, Laporte, & Munoz, 2016; Thöns &
Stewart, 2020). Critical infrastructure is identified as both a primary
target of terrorist attacks, through which the effects of the attack are felt
widely by the populace, as well as a potential tool to be used in terrorist
attacks, as was the case in the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2011
(Clarke, 2004; Zoli, Steinberg, Grabowski, & Hermann, 2018). Critical
infrastructure is also essential to a wide range of business operations,
from transporting goods and people to conducting financial transactions
electronically. Motivated by prior research in international business,
public policy and the built environment, we thus turn our attention to
the impact of terrorism hazard on private investment in infrastructure
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projects in developing countries. The goal of this paper is to assess the
extent to which terrorism impacts investments abroad, in the context of
complex, private participation infrastructure (PPI) projects. In doing so,
we aim to provide new insights into how terrorism hazard impacts in
ternational business decisions, in the context of partnering for PPI
project construction (Liu & Li, 2020).
PPI projects are infrastructure developments in which all or a portion
of the capital is provided by private investors. Traditionally, PPI projects
have been limited by national security concerns and consequent
perceived erosion of sovereignty (Henisz, Zelner, & Guillén, 2005).
However, as governments of developing economies increasingly recog
nize the critical role of infrastructure in economic development, and
often find it difficult to raise capital through fiscal policy, they seek to
accelerate development through the inclusion of private capital and
ownership (Jiang, Peng, Yang, & Mutlu, 2015; Ramamurti & Doh,
2004). As a result, the volume of capital contributed to these projects has
increased tenfold between 1994 and 2013, from $41.3 billion to $415.0
billion, and is forecasted to reach more than $90 trillion in the period
2015–2030 (Bielenberg, Kerlin, Oppenheim, & Roberts, 2016; Dor
obantu, Lindner, & Müllner, 2020; Esty, 1999).
PPIs are a concession-oriented type of public–private partnership (i.
e. the private sector is involved and operates as a contractor) (Hodge &
Greve, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & Van Twist, 2008) in which a
financially and organizationally independent entity is created tempo
rarily by a consortium of companies, called sponsors, who collaborate
closely to ensure the successful execution and completion of the project
(Eriksson, Larsson, & Pesämaa, 2017). Designed as stand-alone project
companies with no previous history or assets, these entities are typically
funded through non-recourse loans which are secured only by the future
cash flows generated by the infrastructure (Dorobantu et al., 2020). The
ability of sponsors to tolerate various transaction costs has a critical role
on the actual cost and viability of the projects. Despite being temporary,
these projects may last years or decades, especially when the infra
structure is yet to be built. Given their cost, duration, and their strategic
and long-lasting impact on the countrýs development, private partici
pation infrastructure projects are often politically important though at
times also controversial (Eriksson et al., 2017).
Governments that are more accountable to their citizens are typically
more responsive to the threats posed by terrorism, and the policies
implemented by the state tend to disrupt the orderly movement of
people and materials within an infrastructure system (Spich & Grosse,
2005). We therefore predict that government accountability in the PPI
host country strengthens the negative relationship between terrorism
hazard and project success, as more responsive governments are likely to
mitigate the perceptual hazards of terrorism through heightened secu
rity measures. We also examine the potential mitigating effect of in
vestors’ experience with terrorism hazard in their home country. We
thus address the following research questions: (1) to what extent does
terrorism hazard impact project completion? and, (2) to what extent is
the hazard posed by terrorism on project completion influenced by the
level of voice and accountability of the host country and experience with
terrorism hazard in the investors’ home country?
Applying transaction cost theory (TCT: Henisz et al., 2010; Wil
liamson, 1981), we argue that terrorism hazard is negatively associated
with the performance of private participation projects because terrorism
produces both direct and indirect consequences that increase the risk of
cost overruns. One of the key insight of TCT is that organizational actors
choose the most efficient structure for transactions, depending on their
relative degree of uncertainty, frequency and, especially, asset speci
ficity (Williamson, 1985). Given that PPIs are idiosyncratic to the needs
of the country that has opened them to private bidding, and that the
organization for fulfilling these contracts is temporary in nature, their
organizational structure can be conceptualized as a nexus of assetspecific, incomplete contracts between government, transnational or
ganizations (e.g. the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.),
and private construction enterprises. Similar to the manner in which

cultural and linguistic differences between contracting partners increase
uncertainty and information asymmetries, thereby impacting organi
zational performance, (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Cuypers, Gokhan,
& Hennart, 2015), we argue that terrorism hazard increases transaction
costs within this nexus of contracts.
We also examine two mitigating factors impacting the degree to
which terrorism hazard impacts project success. We argue for a
strengthening of the negative relationship when accountability of the
host country government is higher, as accountability leads to higher
transaction costs for PPI via enhanced supply chain security measures
(Spich & Grosse, 2005). Also, based on the finding that firm-specific
assets can reduce transaction costs, (Buckley, 1988; Buckley, Chen,
Clegg, & Voss, 2018; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), we predict that when
investors have more experience dealing with terrorism hazard, they are
less averse to the risks it poses and more effective in dealing with them,
which increases the firms’ commitment to the project and hence the
likelihood of its successful completion. This prediction is aligned with
extensions to TCT which show that psychological framing of risks im
pacts aversion to exchange in incomplete contracts, thus raising trans
action costs (Weber, Mayer, & Macher, 2011).
To answer our research questions, we analyze a sample of 5,083
projects in 135 developing economy countries from 2002 to 2017 and
find robust empirical support to validate our hypotheses. In responding
to these research questions, our paper makes the following contribu
tions. First, we contribute to the body of literature devoted to private
participation projects (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003; Jiménez, Jiang,
Petersen, & Gammelgaard, 2019; Ramamurti & Doh, 2004) by showing
empirical evidence that terrorism hazard has a negative, relationship
with the likelihood of PPI project completion. We also find that projects
undertaken in countries with more responsive governments (those with
stronger voice and accountability) tend to face increased hazard, sug
gesting that government response to terrorism may unintentionally
impede infrastructure development. Finally, we find that experiential
learning (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Getz & Oetzel, 2009) from home
country terrorism levels is partially transferrable to projects in countries
where terrorism poses a similar threat.
Our study also contributes to existing transaction cost analyses of
exchange contexts comprised of a mixture of market and non-market
transactions (Buckley & Boddewyn, 2015). Evidence from prior
research on investment location choice suggests that the costs related to
terrorism do not deter MNE investment (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). We argue
that this is because the costs are not easily estimated a priori, whereas in
the case of PPI these costs are gradually realized as projects proceed
through the building and operating phases. Hence, the probability of
successfully completing projects undertaken in countries with higher
terrorist activity will be reduced due to higher than expected costs and
increased investor anxiety.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Terrorism hazard and infrastructure development project completion
Transaction cost theory (TCT) provides a valuable lens through
which to examine the impact of various types of hazards on investment
by profit-seeking organizations (Henisz, 2002; Williamson, 1981).
Transaction costs, comprised of contract negotiation, monitoring, and
enforcement costs, are incurred when searching for, engaging with, and
monitoring customer and supplier relationships (Hennart, 1991). These
costs exist due to the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality,
opportunism, and bounded reliability, where organizational perfor
mance is dependent upon properly aligning governance mechanisms
with the characteristics of the transaction (Williamson, 1981). For
multinational business, transaction costs vary from country to country
depending on the qualities of property rights, macro-economic policy,
and cultural differences (Cuypers et al., 2015; Cuypers, 2021). TCT,
originally applied to the “make vs. buy” decision, is also fruitfully
722
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applied to the study of organizational forms that are prevalent in PPI,
including strategic alliances, supply chains, and public–private part
nerships (Cuypers, 2021). PPIs, being large-scale construction projects,
designed to idiosyncratic specifications (i.e. possessing assetspecificity), involve several entities such as contractors, suppliers of
material, equipment, engineering services, and so forth. This diverse
network of actors, while working together over a period spanning many
years and even decades, are nonetheless temporary in nature, such that
governance mechanisms are inevitably a mix of market and hierarchy.
The cost of conducting these transactions tends to increase in the pres
ence of uncertainty, incomplete information, and specificity of the
product or service created (Ramamurti & Doh, 2004; Williamson, 1985).
Terrorism hazard adds an additional element of uncertainty, and is
costly to mitigate (Chasdi, 2017b; Czinkota et al., 2010).
Terrorist activity is intermittent, isolated, and driven by ideology,
and usually targets non-combatants (Wernick, 2006). The frequency and
severity of prior terrorist incidents are therefore imprecise predictors of
future incidents. Building on TCT logic, and the current empirical evi
dence, terrorism hazard is likely to increase transaction costs, as an
unavoidable consequence of regulatory responses (Chasdi, 2017a;
Czinkota et al., 2010). In this study, we focus on the extent to which
terrorism hazard impacts the performance of private participation pro
jects, dependent upon not only the absolute hazard posed by terrorism in
the host country, but also the hazard relative to that of the investors’
home country. Performance, in this case, is not related to the profit
ability or subsequent survival of a venture, but to the successful
completion of the project, which can be threatened when investors
choose to withdraw their support in the face of changing risk and/or
their tolerance for it. Hence, given the boundaries for rational decisionmaking specific to PPI investment (i.e. the inability of multinational
investors to select an ideal location for a specific project, and to infer
future terrorist events from prior events), the costs of the project cannot
be accurately predicted prior to investment, and tend to reveal them
selves gradually through supply chain inefficiencies and added security
costs.
Terrorism has both direct and indirect impacts on firms (Tingbani
et al., 2019). The direct effects, including loss of life and property
damage, are felt acutely at the site of an attack and these attacks can also
have lasting impacts on the systems and psyche of the societies in which
they occur (Chasdi, 2017a). Despite being intermittent and relatively
rare, the profound and lasting impact of terrorism motivates firms to
take actions and incur additional expenses to prevent or minimize the
direct effects of a terrorist attack. These indirect effects of terrorism are
the primary impacts of terrorism on the daily operations of firms
(Czinkota, Knight, & Liesch, 2004). Costs are derived from the in
vestments in enhanced security, contract monitoring, and negotiation,
information asymmetry arising from the myriad government policies
designed to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks on the built environment,
and supply chain inefficiencies resulting from added oversight and
reduced mobility of resources, especially across borders (Czinkota et al.,
2010; Lian & Haimes, 2006; Matsika et al., 2016).
Building resiliency into a system is costly (O’Rourke, 2007; Stewart,
2010), as are construction methods used to maintain the structural
integrity of buildings in the presence of damaging forces. Heightened
security and increased insurance premiums impede the flow of both
people and materials, in turn reducing transaction efficiency (Powers &
Choi, 2012). Like the enhanced screening procedures of the Trans
portation Safety Administration introduced following terrorist attacks in
the US, which had a negative impact on air travel in the days following
the 9/11 attacks and can still be felt to a lesser extent today, new in
efficiencies and costs are created by incremental changes to existing,
complex systems (Spich & Grosse, 2005). Both the enhanced security
and the improvements made to increase the flow of traffic are costly, and
these costs are borne by travelers, airlines, airports, and/or govern
ments. These costs also reduce the mobility of financial assets and the
materials required in abundance for infrastructure projects, especially

when crossing borders.
PPI projects are thus an ideal empirical setting for testing the impact
of terrorism hazard on organizational performance. Given that in
vestors’ interests are secyred by future cash flows, the financing of these
projects is very sensitive to host country hazard characteristics (Esty,
1999; Esty & Megginson, 2003; Hainz & Kleimeier, 2012; Byoun & Xu,
2014; Müllner, 2017; Dorobantu & Müllner, 2019). PPIs are usually very
large investments and require the deployment of many physical assets
that are subject to the potentially damaging effects of terrorist attacks.
Likewise, foreign ownership of these projects creates a particularly
salient symbol of colonialism making them salient targets for left-wing
terrorism (Chasdi, 2017a). Finally, infrastructure projects tend to be
idiosyncratic with respect to their design and hence heterogeneous with
respect to the types and quantities of materials and knowledge required
to complete them successfully. Hence, the effects of supply chain
disruption, created by changes in importation and transportation pol
icies in response to terrorism threats, are likely to have a particularly
acute impact.
Based on the transaction cost consequences of terrorism hazard
described above, we therefore propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Host country terrorism hazard is negatively associated with the
probability of completion of a private participation project.
2.2. Government accountability and terrorism hazard
In addition to altering the relevance of firm-specific assets, differ
ences in the governance environment from country to country can also
influence the magnitude of transaction costs (Chi, 2015; Hennart, 2009).
Terrorism creates an environment in which conducting transactions is
less efficient, due to government interventions aimed at enhancing se
curity and thwarting attacks (Czinkota et al., 2004; Spich & Grosse,
2005). Countries with stronger accountability to their citizens typically
respond more quickly and forcefully to crises, implementing disastermitigating policies that disrupt the movement of people, money and
materials within an orderly supply chain (Spich & Grosse, 2005). Gov
ernments that are more accountable are also more responsive to the
demands of important stakeholders, and their commitments are
considered more credible (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Research has
consistently shown that MNEs are more likely to choose locations in
which governments have demonstrated accountability (Daude & Stein,
2007) and consequently foreign subsidiaries tend to survive longer in
these locations. However, we argue that accountability also has a
downside for conducting transactions efficiently in the context of
terrorism hazard.
The ability of citizens to express their concerns about the effective
control and prevention of terrorist activity, along with the expectation
that national governments will act within the best interests of the citi
zens, is a crucial feedback mechanism for the implementation of policies
and practices aimed at curbing terrorist violence. In countries where
accountability is higher, disasters tend to result in fewer deaths and
shorter disruptions (Gassebner, Keck, & Teh, 2010). Overt displays of
heightened security, such as the presence of heavily armed police in the
transportation network of New York city in the years following the at
tacks on the World Trade Center, are intended to both deter would-be
attackers and instill confidence among the multitude of travelers who
contribute to the local economy (Spich & Grosse, 2005). All of these
responses add extra bureaucratic obstacles to the flow of goods and
people, creating additional costs which are gradually revealed during
the execution phase of large infrastructure projects.
In summary, a country’s accountability increases its government’s
motivation to respond to terrorist threats, thereby improving public
trust. The associated costs of reassuring the public can, in turn, aggra
vate the relationship between terrorism hazard and the completion of
PPI projects.
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A. Jiménez and N.C. Lupton

Journal of Business Research 135 (2021) 721–730

H2: The negative relationship between a country’s terrorism hazard and
the probability of completion of a private participation project in that
country is stronger in host countries with higher levels of voice and
accountability.

is weaker when the level of terrorism hazard of the investor’s home
country is high.
3. Method

2.3. Transferability of terrorism hazard experience

3.1. Sample

TCT posits that firms engage in investments abroad where con
ducting arms-length (i.e. market-based) transactions in intermediate
product markets is more expensive (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Following
extensions to the original TCT (Hennart, 2009; Rugman, 1981) we
consider the impact of the interaction between location characteristics
and firm-specific assets driving ownership structure, strategy and, ulti
mately, performance. Following research in international business, in
particular, (Li & Vashchilko, 2010; Oetzel & Getz, 2012; Oh & Oetzel,
2017), we argue that experience with terrorism hazard in the investor’s
home country mitigates the negative impact of terrorism hazard in the
host country on project completion. That is, experience working within a
supply chain and institutional system impacted by policy response to
terrorism (i.e. enhanced screening of people, financial and material as
sets, added security, disclosure, and information gathering re
quirements) is a firm-specific asset that is transferrable to locations with
similar hazard profiles.
TCT also stresses the contextual relevance of firm-specific assets for
reducing transaction costs, with an emphasis on moderating influences
of location characteristics (Erramilli, Agarwal, & Kim, 1997; Hennart,
2009; Rugman, 1981). That is, the extent to which a firm-specific asset is
fungible depends on its relevance and strength compared with host
country domestic competition. Therefore, while terrorism hazard is ex
pected to add costs to most projects, we argue that these costs will
transfer at different rates amongst projects. Investors from countries
with high levels of terrorism hazard likely have experience dealing with
heightened security measures and policies that impact the efficiency of
supply chains, distribution channels, and overall cost of construction
(Driffield et al., 2013).
Prior research has found that a firm’s country-specific experience
managing subsidiaries in violence-prone regions decreases the impact of
violence on subsequent investments, but that this experience may not
always be transferrable to other countries. Other things being equal,
firms will tend to avoid high-conflict regions, and experience operating
in a country with high conflict neither improves nor reduces the odds of
investing in another high-conflict country (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). While
this suggests that foreign investors may not perceive their experience
with conflict as an asset to be exploited, it does not necessarily mean that
it cannot provide a benefit after an investment in a similarly high-risk
context is made. Furthermore, given the location-bound nature of PPI,
investors have substantially fewer options when choosing locations and
hence must be more involved in managing hazards where an opportu
nity arises (Jiang et al., 2015). Finally, terrorism is sporadic, and its
effects are more commonly felt by business indirectly (Abadie & Der
misi, 2008). These effects can create an “imprinting” effect on business
organizations, which impacts how firms react to future opportunities
and hazards in different institutional environments (Konara & Shir
odkar, 2018; Stinchcombe, 1965). Therefore, we argue not only that the
costs arising from heightened terrorism hazard (insurance, using dis
tribution channels, security, etc.) can be better anticipated by more
experienced investors, but also that experience with heightened
terrorism hazard reduces investors’ anxiety. Hence, experienced in
vestors will tend to exhibit more patience in the face of increased
terrorism hazard, leading to a higher probability that they will remain
committed to the project through completion.
Hence, we predict that projects funded by investors from countries
with higher terrorism hazard will be more likely to succeed.

Our sample consists of private participation projects from the World
Banḱs Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database, a
source commonly used in the literature (Fleta-Asin, Munoz, & RosellMartinez, 2019; Jiang et al., 2015; Jiménez, Salvaj, & Lee, 2018;
Wang, Liu, Xiong, & Zhu, 2019). It is comprised of 5,875 private
participation projects, of which the main sponsor is a foreign investor,
between 2002 and 2013, in 135 developing economy countries for
which data on terrorism hazard is available. Accounting for missing data
on variables of interest, our final sample size is 5,083. Host countries
included in the sample are shown in Table 1.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
A PPI project is deemed complete when its investors fulfill the
capitalization requirements, develop the facility, and provide the ser
vices outlined in a legally-binding contract (Jiang et al., 2015). When
the concession period is terminated prematurely by either the govern
ment or other sponsors, then the project is deemed to be incomplete.
The World Bank’s PPI Project Database contains five categories of
Table 1
Host countries included in sample of PPI projects.
Afghanistan

Côte d’Ivoire

Lebanon

Senegal

Albania
Algeria
American Samoa

Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.

Lesotho
Liberia
Macedonia,
FYR
Madagascar
Malawi

Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands

El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji

Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania

Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan

Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Ghana

Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia

Bolivia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African
Republic
Chad

Grenada
Guatemala

Montenegro
Morocco

South Sudan
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and
Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syrian Arab
Republic
Tajikistan
Tanzania

Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana, CR
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq

Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama

Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine

Jamaica

Uzbekistan

China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.

Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Dem.
People’s Rep
Kosovo

Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Romania

Yemen, Rep.

Costa Rica
Cuba

Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR

Russian
Federation
Rwanda
Samoa

Angola
Antigua and
Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh

H3: The relationship between a host country’s terrorism hazard and the
probability of completion of a private participation project in that country
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Somalia
South Africa

Vanuatu
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
West Bank and Gaza

Zambia
Zimbabwe
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project status. Among these statuses are “operational”, when the project
is in service; “merged”, when the project has been combined with
another active project; and “concluded”, when the contract period has
expired. Each of these three statuses is considered complete, as each
indicates that the project is either functional, concluded, or actively
working towards the expected outcome. A project status of “cancelled”
or “distressed” indicates that the project has either been abandoned or is
in arbitration. The private sector investor(s) may have exited the project
in any of the following ways: selling or transferring the economic in
terest back to the government before fulfilling the contract terms;
removing all personnel from the project; or ceasing operation, service
provision, or construction for 15 percent or more of the license or
concession period, following the revocation of the license or repudiation
of the contract. We thus consider either of these two statuses as failures,
and code a binary variable accordingly (1 = completed).

Table 2
Description of key variables.
Variable name

Description

Completion

1 if project status is “operational”, “merged”,
or “concluded”, 0 if project status is
“cancelled” or “distressed” (PPI Project
Database)
Set of four dummy variables representing
sectors. 1 if project is in the sector, 0 otherwise
(PPI Project Database)
Log of the total amount of investment in the
project (PPI Project Database)
Time lapse between the year in which the
project took place and nowadays (PPI Project
Database)
Delay between project closure and the project
commitment (PPI Project Database)
1 if project is greenfield, 0 otherwise (PPI
Project Database)
1 if project consortium includes the host
government as an owner, 0 otherwise (PPI
Project Database)
Number of terrorist incidents within the host
country in the previous year (Global Terrorism
Database)
Index of perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a
free media (Worldwide Governance
Indicators)
Number of terrorist incidents within the home
country in the previous year (Global Terrorism
Database)

Sector (energy, telecommunications,
transport, water sewerage)
Total investment
Age
Delay
Greenfield

3.2.2. Independent variable
To measure host and home countries’ terrorism hazard, we use the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2017), which has been previously
used in the literature (Tingbani et al., 2019). Terrorism hazard is
measured by the number of terrorist incidents within a country.
Terrorist incidents include threat and violence, with social, religious,
political, and economic motives (Greenbaum et al., 2007). We lagged all
the explanatory variables included in the model (independent, moder
ators, and controls) by one year.

Host government ownership
Host terrorism hazard
Voice and accountability

3.2.3. Moderating variables
We propose in Hypothesis 2 that the relationship between terrorism
hazard in the host country and private participation projects will be
moderated by the level of voice and accountability in the host country.
We obtain this variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
database (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, &
Mastruzzi, 2008). Next, we propose in Hypothesis 3 that the relationship
between terrorism hazard in the host country and private participation
projects will be moderated by the level of terrorism hazard in the home
country. We again use the GTD to obtain data on the level of terrorism
hazard in the home countries of the main investor of the project, i.e. the
one holding the largest share of ownership.

Home terrorism hazard

4. Results
We report the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables
in the model in Table 3. All correlation coefficients are not high, and all
individual VIFs are lower than 10 as advised by (Studenmund & Cassidy,
1992), except that related to voice. Yet, collinearity does not seem to be
a serious concern as the correlation coefficients of voice with all other
variables are very low (<0.3). Besides, following Kalnins (2018), we
checked that the signs and magnitudes of the rest of the variables in the
models are consistent when voice is excluded. Finally, as noted by
Lindner, Puck, and Verbeke (2019) “… multicollinearity in a regression
model is likely to do no worse than inflate standard errors which,
although not optimal, will do no more than making results more con
servative” (p. 9) as it does not bias the coefficient estimates.
We present the results of sequential logistic regression analyses hi
erarchically in Table 4. Model 1 is the base model including only the
control variables. Model 2 adds the level of terrorism hazard in the host
country to test Hypothesis 1. Model 3 includes the level of voice and
accountability of the host country and its interaction with the level of
host country terrorism hazard to test Hypothesis 2. Model 4 includes the
home country’s level of terrorism hazard and its interaction with the
level of host country terrorism hazard to test Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative relationship between terrorism
hazard of the country in which a PPI project is located and project
completion. The rationale was that lower levels of terrorism hazard
would have minimal impact on project completion, but higher levels of
hazards would begin to substantially impact policies that would reduce
factor mobility, in turn reducing the efficiency of the supply chain. The
results show that the coefficient terrorism hazard in the host country is
negative and significant (β = -0.825, p < 0.001, s.e. = 0.228). Since
logistic regression produces a non-linear estimate of the relationship
between terrorism hazard and the probability of PPI project success (i.e.
by estimating the linear relationship between the log of the odds ratio of
success and the independent variable; in this case, terrorism hazard), we
provide the plot depicted in Fig. 1.

3.2.4. Control variables
Our models include country fixed effects, to account for potential
unobserved heterogeneity between the 135 host countries in our sample.
We also include project-level control variables in the model that could
have a potential impact on project performance. First, we include the
age of the project, and the delay between the project closure and the
project commitment. We also include dummy variables to control for
projects that include the host government as a sponsor, and for those
that are greenfield investments. Finally, we include dummy variables for
the sectors identified in the PPI dataset (energy, telecommunications,
water sewerage, and transport). Telecommunications is used as the
reference category, so a variable was not generated for this sector. To
control for unobserved country-level effects, we include country in
dicators (i.e. dummy variables). Table 2 provides the definition and
operationalization of the variables included in the model
3.3. Model estimation
To study the impact of terrorism hazard on the performance of pri
vate participation projects we use binary logistic regression models.
Regarding the moderation hypotheses, Haans, Pieters, and He (2016)
have recently demonstrated that mean-centering the interacted vari
ables is not necessary. However, mean-centering and standardizing
improve interpretability of the coefficients and plotting interactions
(Osborne, 2015) Hence we report in the main models the results when
continuous variables all mean-centered.
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Table 4
Logit regression result.

(279.5)
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(0.403)
− 0.126
− 0.177
− 0.138

Sector =
Transport
Sector = Water
sewerage
Total investment
Age
Delay

(4.049)
− 0.116
− 0.139
0.208
− 0.096
− 0.114
− 0.210
(1,727)
− 0.110
0.351
− 0.070
0.076
0.022
0.064
0.024

(4.971)
− 0.100
0.165
− 0.034
0.054
− 0.040

Host government
ownership
Predictors
Host terrorism
hazard (H1)
Voice and
accountability
Home terrorism
hazard
Interactions
Host terrorism
hazard * Voice
(H2)
Host terrorism
hazard * Home
terrorism
hazard (H3)
Constant

(0.337)
− 0.080
0.151
− 0.138
− 0.176
0.025
− 0.140
− 0.292
− 0.156

7

(3)
Host
terrorism
hazard *
Voice

(4)
Host
terrorism
hazard *
Home
terrorism
hazard

0.795**
(0.289)
1.06**
(0.374)
0.766
(0.433)
0.00
(0.00005)
− 0.657***
(0.099)
− 0.089
(0.104)
1.228***
(0.232)
− 0.121
(0.226)

0.782**
(0.295)
1.014**
(0.382)
0.766
(0.439)
0.000
(0.00005)
− 0.880***
(0.115)
− 0.150
(0.107)
1.196***
(0.234)
− 0.136
(0.232)

0.812**
(0.298)
1.022**
(0.385)
0.797
(0.443)
0.000
(0.00005)
− 0.931***
(0.118)
− 0.177
(0.108)
1.211***
(0.237)
− 0.093
(0.237)

0.810**
(0.299)
0.990**
(0.385)
0.780 (0.678)

− 0.931***
(0.220)

− 0.599**
(0.218)
− 0.320
(0.665)

− 0.825***
(0.228)
− 0.538
(0.678)
0.019 (0.208)

− 0.819**
(0.283)

− 1.389**
(0.401)

(0.401)
− 0.192
− 0.007
0.087
− 0.114
− 0.401
− 0.063
0.190
0.175
0.156

Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
Observations

0.000
(0.00005)
− 0.921***
(0.120)
− 0.172
(0.108)
1.210***
(0.238)
− 0.098
(0.238)

0.285*
(0.144)
− 0.247
(0.928)
− 523.75
0.249
5,110

− 0.660
(0.957)
− 559.61
0.263
5,110

− 0.558
(0.978)
− 549.71
0.269
5,083

− 0.580
(0.996)
− 547.32
0.272
5,083

(0.498)
− 0.552
− 0.424
− 0.117
− 0.127
− 0.235
0.383
− 0.009
− 0.051
0.084
− 0.022

Notes: Country indicators included in all models. Base category for sector is ICT.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

(0.327)
− 0.411
− 0.187
− 0.143
0.268
− 0.068
0.637
0.097
0.065
− 0.011
− 0.043
0.005

Standard deviation on the diagonal, in brackets.

4
3
2

(2)
Host
terrorism
hazard

(0.170)
− 0.080
0.066
− 0.031
0.016
− 0.010
− 0.103
− 0.079
0.110
− 0.026
− 0.035
− 0.038
0.002

1
Mean

0.970
0.122
0.547
0.201
0.130
474.0
7.854
2.211
0.685
0.204
90.80
− 0.337
135.34
1. Completion
2. Telecommunication
3. Energy
4. Transport
5. Water sewerage
6. Total investment
7. Age
8. Delay
9. Greenfield
10. Host government ownership
11. Host terrorism hazard
12. Voice and accountability
13. Home terrorism hazard

5

6

8

Greenfield

Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.

(1)
Base model

(0.822)
0.205
(207.4)
0.232
0.748

Controls
Sector = Energy

(0.464)
− 0.129
− 0.077
− 0.107
− 0.042

9

10

11

12

VARIABLES

Fig. 1. Probability of project success and terrorism hazard. Notes: Terrorism
hazard is normalized (unit = 1 standard deviation), bands represent 95%
confidence intervals for predicted values of probability of success.
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Model 3 includes the interaction between the host country’s level of
terrorism hazard and the level of voice and accountability. Hypothesis 2
proposes that the negative relationship between terrorism hazard in the
host country and project performance will be strengthened when the
level of voice and accountability in the host country is higher. The
interaction term between terrorism hazard in the host country and the
level of voice and accountability is negative and statistically significant
(β = -1.389, p < 0.01, s.e. = 0.401). Given the logistic nature of the
relationship we study, we rely on graphical analysis to depict the
moderating relationship (Ai & Norton, 2003; Boellis, Mariotti, Mini
chilli, & Piscitello, 2016). The plot of the predicted relationship, for
values of voice and accountability 1.5 standard deviations above and
below the mean, is depicted in Fig. 2, showing a strengthening effect on
the negative relationship between host terrorism hazard and project
completion, at higher levels of voice and accountability. The 95% con
fidence intervals for the predicted marginal effects are not overlapping
for values of host country terrorism hazard two or more standard de
viations above the mean. This result suggests that higher levels of voice
and accountability in the host country attenuate the inverted effect of
terrorism hazard in the host country on project performance, thus sup
porting Hypothesis 2.
Model 4 adds the interaction between host and home countries’ level
of terrorism hazard. Hypothesis 3 proposes that the relationship be
tween terrorism hazard in the host country and project performance will
be stronger when the level of terrorism hazard in the home country is
higher. The interaction term between terrorism hazard in the host
country and in the home country is positive and statistically significant
(β = 0.285, p = 0.05, s.e. = 144). Fig. 3 plots the relationship between
host country terrorism hazard and the probability of project success for
values of home country terrorism hazard one standard deviation below,
and four standard deviations above, the mean. Where the 95% confi
dence intervals for estimates of the margin effects are not overlapping,
the nature of the interaction is a weakening effect on the negative
relationship between host terrorism hazard and project completion, at
higher levels of main sponsor home country terrorism hazard. This result
suggests that higher terrorism hazard in the home country of private
investors attenuates the effect of terrorism hazard in the host country on
project performance, thus supporting Hypothesis 3.

Fig. 3. Interaction of home country terrorism hazard experience and host
country terrorism hazard.

significant evidence of a negative relationship between terrorism hazard
and private participation projects’ completion. Building on transaction
cost theory (Williamson, 1985), we hypothesized that higher terrorism
hazard would increase transaction costs, and therefore decrease the
probability of project success (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008; Branzei &
Abdelnour, 2010; Chasdi, 2017a; Henisz et al., 2010). We also found
that higher host government accountability aggravated the impact of
terrorism hazard on the completion of these projects. Finally, investors’
prior experience with terrorism hazard at home, as predicted, appears to
weaken the relationship between terrorism hazard level in the host
country, and the probability of PPI project completion, supporting our
argument that, within this context, experience with terrorism hazard is
transferrable.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on PPI projects
(Jiménez et al., 2019; Jiménez et al., 2018; Li, Liu, Shrestha, Martek, &
Zhang, 2018) as an extension to the more commonly studied
manufacturing and commercial organizations. Following others (e.g.
Buckley & Boddewyn, 2015), we extend TCT to non-market transactions
involved in building and managing PPI projects in host locations. The
two main premises of TCT, derived from rational action modeling
(Buckley & Casson, 1998), are that firms select the lowest (expected)
cost location for the investment, and that they own and manage assets,
rather than contracting for services, to the extent that the added costs of
further growth exceed the benefits. We likewise argue that terrorism
hazard is associated with higher location and transaction costs. In
accordance with the global systems perspective derived from the orig
inal theory, which views firms and institutions as interconnected and
mutually embedded (Buckley & Hashai, 2004), we explored some of the
implications of an exogenous hazard and its cost implications. Given the
unpredictability of terrorism, it is not easily factored into the needed
return on investment for infrastructure projects and, as a result, in
vestors are more likely to withdraw support for projects prior to
completion when the hazard is high.
To date, business research explaining the impact of conflict and
terrorism has focused primarily on private investment that is aimed at
generating new revenue streams or improving supply chain efficiency
(Chen, 2017; Oh & Oetzel, 2011; Witte, Burger, Ianchovichina, & Pen
nings, 2017). Research on terrorism hazard in the built environment, on
the other hand, has focused on the impact of attacks on infrastructure
and its occupants, as well as public policy formulation to mitigate these
impacts (Clarke, 2004; Zoli et al., 2018). This study provides a trans
action cost perspective on the growing literature on PPI projects as nontraditional, yet increasingly relevant, investment opportunities. Previ
ous studies on private participation projects have examined the impact
of project-specific characteristics, such as the method of privatization

5. Discussion
In this study we analyzed the relationship between terrorism hazard
and the likelihood of completion of private participation projects in
emerging countries. Drawing on a sample of 5,083 projects in 109
countries from 2002 to 2017, we argued and found statistically

Fig. 2. Interaction of host government voice and accountability and
terrorism hazard.
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(Djankov, 1999), and state ownership (Doh, 2000; Doh, Teegen, &
Mudambi, 2004; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013), on their
completion. Others have examined the effect of country characteristics
such as government credibility (Ramamurti, 2003), policy reforms
(Henisz et al., 2005), and political risk/stability (Jiang et al., 2015;
Jiménez et al., 2018). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
to examine the impact of host country terrorism hazard on project
completion rates.
We also found that host country accountability weakens the impact
of terrorism hazard on project completion, a finding which aligns with
the notion that host country-specific characteristics can impact trans
action costs (Buckley, 2016; Hennart, 2009). Accountability, and its
strong association with private property rights, is a key enabler of eco
nomic growth and also plays an important role in FDI attraction (Alesina
& Rodrik, 1994; Henisz, 2000). In the case of PPI projects, government
accountability is also deemed important for completing projects in a
cost-effective manner (Wu, Liu, Jin, & Sing, 2016). However, as gov
ernments strive to meet the needs of different stakeholder groups, the
extreme physical and psychological threats posed by terrorism will often
outweigh concerns for transaction efficiency. While it is not suggested
that governments should de-emphasize threat-mitigation efforts, the
need for a more effective and consistent approach to doing so should be
a priority for transnational organizations, especially as the approaches
used vary substantially between countries at present (Matsika et al.,
2016).
Finally, through our examination of the mitigating effect of firms’
terrorism hazard experience on the relationship between terrorism
hazard and project completion, we contribute to the cross-border
applicability of non-production related management knowledge as a
firm-specific asset that can be helpful in reducing transaction costs
associated with increased terrorism hazard (Buckley, 2016; Rugman,
1981). Experience operating business in the context of higher conflict
hazard does not always transfer readily across borders, perhaps because
the type of conflict is very idiosyncratic from one location to the next
(Oh & Oetzel, 2011). As a result, it has been found that terrorism hazard
experience is not a major factor when selecting investment locations (Oh
& Oetzel, 2017). However, in the context of PPIs, we find supporting
evidence that the impact of prior experience mitigates the negative
relationship between terrorism hazard and project completion. The
reason, we argue, is that this type of home country environment not only
allows managers to learn how to deal with similar institutions in other
countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), but more importantly impacts
perceptions of investment opportunities and risks, such that their
commitment to projects is stronger (Konara & Shirodkar, 2018). Thus,
our findings support that experience with terrorism hazard in the home
country leads to a higher probability of a favorable outcome, and hence
this form of learning is at least partly transferrable to new projects and
locations.
Our paper also has relevant implications for managers and policy
makers. First, in addition to highlighting the importance of terrorism
hazard in the host country, our paper suggests managers should be
aware that their prior exposure and familiarity with terrorism in their
home country can influence how they perceive hazards abroad. For
policymakers, our results emphasize the role of voice and accountability
in mitigating terrorism hazard. Hence, increasing the perception of their
countries as destinations where reforms are taking place to increase both
supply chain efficiency and the level of government accountability will
boost the performance of foreign infrastructure investments.

Second, in this paper we focus on terrorism hazard, but the literature on
major risks/hazards has identified other potential sources of uncertainty
for investors such as technological disasters, war, and climate risks.
Future studies can analyze how these types of risks affect private
participation projects. Third, the year coverage in our analysis
(2002–2017) is constrained by the data availability in the sources we
employ, and future studies could confirm if our findings hold in other
periods.
Overall, we believe that our paper adds to the growing body of
literature on privatization projects (Fleta-Asin et al., 2019; Jiang et al.,
2015; Jiménez et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019) and on
major disasters (Oh & Oetzel, 2011) and addresses calls for new
business-oriented perspectives on terrorism hazard (Czinkota et al.,
2010; Henisz et al., 2010). Yet, more efforts are needed to understand
how major disasters affect private participation projects, and we
encourage other scholars to continue this line of investigation to deepen
our knowledge on this topic.
6. Conclusion
Through an empirical study of PPIs in emerging economies, we found
that terrorism hazard increases the failure rate of projects. Applying a
transaction cost lens and conducting a moderated binary logistic
regression analysis, we found support for our prediction that, due to the
fact that PPI projects are undertaken by a complex network of actors
working in temporary governance arrangements, they are subject to
transaction costs arising from incomplete contracts and the bounded
reliability of partners. We reported evidence that these transaction costs
associated with terrorism hazard are negatively associated with project
completion rates, especially when the external policy environment (i.e.
voice and accountability) favors safety, and psychological security, over
transaction efficiency. Furthermore, firms that have experience with
terrorism hazard at home are less prone to the psychological impact of
terrorism hazard on project risk assessment, such that projects involving
more experienced firms have a higher probability of success. Further
research is needed to assess the extent to which various configurations of
public, private, and NGO actors are beneficial when dealing with the
heightened transaction inefficiencies posed by terrorism hazard.
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